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Price Analysis, Risk Assessment, and Insurance for Organic Crops
Abstract
In recent years, the organic sector has grown steadily and significantly. However, little economic research has
been performed on risk management in organic agriculture, likely because of the lack of available data. This
lack of data may also be why the creation of the current crop insurance policy for organic farmers has been so
ad hoc.
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 recognized organic farming as a “good farming practice,” making
federal crop insurance coverage available for organic crops, and taking into account the idiosyncrasies of the
organic production system. In addition to the production risks covered for conventional producers, organic
farmers who sign up for coverage are compensated for production losses from damage due to insects, disease,
and/or weeds. However, the incorporation of organic production into the crop insurance rating structure has
been limited. Organic producers are charged an arbitrary 5% premium surcharge over conventional crop
insurance. The actuarial fairness of this premium is, at least, questionable. In addition, in the case of crop
failure, organic farmers receive compensation based on the prices of conventionally produced crops. Thus,
price premiums that organic producers are able to obtain in the market are not compensated for under the
current insurance policy structure.
The Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, which amends part of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, was
written to investigate some of these claims, requiring the U.S. Department of Agriculture to examine the
currently offered federal crop insurance coverage for organic crops as described in the organic policy
provisions of the Act (Title XII). Such provisions established the need to review, among other things, the
underwriting risk and loss experience of organic crops; determine whether significant, consistent, or
systematic variations in loss history exist between organic and nonorganic production; and modify the
coverage for organic crops in accordance with the results.
Here we present the major findings of three analyses we performed on key elements of the insurance of
organic crops—prices, yields, and revenue—in an effort to contribute to the design of an organic crop
insurance policy that covers organic producers according to their idiosyncratic risks.
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Executive Summary 
In recent years, the organic sector has grown steadily and significantly. However, 
little economic research has been performed on risk management in organic agriculture, 
likely because of the lack of available data. This lack of data may also be why the creation 
of the current crop insurance policy for organic farmers has been so ad hoc. 
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 recognized organic farming as a 
“good farming practice,” making federal crop insurance coverage available for organic 
crops, and taking into account the idiosyncrasies of the organic production system. In 
addition to the production risks covered for conventional producers, organic farmers 
who sign up for coverage are compensated for production losses from damage due to 
insects, disease, and/or weeds. However, the incorporation of organic production into 
the crop insurance rating structure has been limited. Organic producers are charged an 
arbitrary 5% premium surcharge over conventional crop insurance. The actuarial 
fairness of this premium is, at least, questionable. In addition, in the case of crop failure, 
organic farmers receive compensation based on the prices of conventionally produced 
crops. Thus, price premiums that organic producers are able to obtain in the market are 
not compensated for under the current insurance policy structure.  
The Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, which amends part of the 
Federal Crop Insurance Act, was written to investigate some of these claims, requiring 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture to examine the currently offered federal crop 
insurance coverage for organic crops as described in the organic policy provisions of the 
Act (Title XII). Such provisions established the need to review, among other things, the 
underwriting risk and loss experience of organic crops; determine whether significant, 
consistent, or systematic variations in loss history exist between organic and nonorganic 
production; and modify the coverage for organic crops in accordance with the results.  
Here we present the major findings of three analyses we performed on key 
elements of the insurance of organic crops—prices, yields, and revenue—in an effort to 
contribute to the design of an organic crop insurance policy that covers organic 
producers according to their idiosyncratic risks. 
 
Keywords:  crop insurance, organic agriculture. 
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Price Analysis, Risk Assessment, and Insurance for  
Organic Crops 
 
By Ariel Singerman, Chad Hart, and Sergio Lence 
 
Over the past decade, organic agriculture has experienced steady and significant growth 
(Organic Trade Association 2009). However, little economic research has been 
performed on risk management in organic agriculture, likely because of the lack of 
available data. The lack of data may also be why the creation of the current crop 
insurance policy for organic farmers has been so ad hoc. 
 
Recently the Risk Management Agency (RMA) updated organic crop insurance coverage. 
This update was forced by the 2008 farm bill, as Congress had specifically required that 
RMA examine the currently offered federal crop insurance coverage for organic crops; 
review the underwriting risk and loss experience of organic crops; determine whether 
significant, consistent, or systematic variations in loss history exist between organic and 
nonorganic production; and modify the coverage for organic crops in accordance with 
the results.  
 
In this policy brief, we summarize the major findings of three analyses performed on key 
elements of the insurance of organic crops—prices, yields, and revenue—in an effort to 
contribute to the design of an organic crop insurance policy that covers organic 
producers according to their idiosyncratic risks. 
 
Organic Crop Prices 
Organic crops often receive a price premium in comparison to conventionally grown 
crops. Born (2005, p. 1) noted that “prices for organic grains and oilseeds were about 
double the conventional prices from 1995 to 2003.” Such “doubling” in organic crop 
prices is a commonly held belief in the organic agriculture sector. But, does that 
“doubling” depict the true existing relationship between the conventional and organic 
grain and oilseed markets? Is there any other relationship that links those conventional 
and organic markets, or are they not really related to each other?  
 
One would expect organic crop prices to closely follow conventional ones in the United 
States, not only because of the thinness of organic markets but also because organic 
crops account for a very small share of cropland. In 2008, only 0.57% of U.S. cropland 
was planted with organic crops. Although organic corn and soybeans are among the 
main U.S. organic crops in terms of acreage, they respectively account for only 0.21% and 
0.20% of the total cropland devoted to such crops (USDA-ERS 2008).  
 
In addition, one might expect organic crops to sell at a premium because there is 
evidence that some consumers strongly prefer them over their conventional counterparts 
(see Loureiro, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer 2001). Organic price premiums are also 
expected because organic production involves additional risks (Klonsky and Greene 
2005) that help explain the lower yields (Porter 2003; Delate and Cambardella 2004). 
McBride and Greene (2008) also found that organic production involves higher costs. 
Therefore, price premiums act as a major incentive in encouraging conventional 
producers and processors to switch to organic agriculture, by making the potential 
returns from organic cropping systems at least as profitable as conventional ones. 
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As an example, Figure 1 displays the organic and conventional corn and soybean spot 
prices in Minneapolis from October 2004 to July 2009. The first noticeable feature in 
Figure 1 is the piecewise linear shape of the organic prices, with organic products having 
a constant price for several weeks before a price change or jump occurs. It is evident that 
organic prices do not follow the same distribution as conventional prices and are better 
characterized by a jump process. 
 
 
 
Note: The crosses denote missing observations in the original series. 
Figure 1. Organic and conventional prices and ratios for soybeans and corn 
in Minneapolis, October 2004–July 2009 
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Their step-shape pricing pattern is likely to be associated with the relative thinness of the 
organic markets and the impact of contracting on them. As shown in the lower plots of 
both panels, the relationship between the organic and conventional prices throughout 
the period analyzed has been oscillating around two; as mentioned earlier, this doubling 
of conventional crop prices to price organic crops is considered the rule of thumb for 
pricing in the organic sector. 
 
An extensive analysis of the data found no evidence of a long-run relationship between 
organic and conventional prices. Thus, the “doubling” (or any other multiplicative) 
hypothesis that endorses that organic crop prices are obtained by multiplying 
conventional prices by a fixed factor is not supported by the data. Since this doubling 
factor is widely accepted in the industry, this may come as a surprise. On one hand, one 
might think that organic crop prices would reflect the additional cost of this method of 
production, making organic crops a “premium” commodity compared with their 
conventional counterparts, and allowing therefore for some degree of substitutability 
between them. In this regard, a close association between organic and conventional 
prices is more likely to be observed if the two types of crops are highly substitutable in 
production or consumption. On the other hand, for some purposes organic and 
conventional crops cannot really be considered close substitutes, if substitutes at all. For 
example, for livestock to be considered organic, it must be fed with organic products. 
 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that some degree of substitutability could exist even in 
this latter context if the producer switches his livestock to conventional feed, making it 
nonorganic livestock. But such substitution is limited to a one-time event, since 
regulations state that “livestock or edible livestock products that are removed from an 
organic operation and subsequently managed on a nonorganic operation may be not 
sold, labeled or represented as organically produced.” Therefore, producers could switch 
their livestock to conventional, but after that they could no longer switch it back to 
organic without going through recertification.  
 
Another dimension to the study consisted of analyzing whether organic prices in 
different locations are related to each other in the long run, to assess how idiosyncratic 
organic markets are. We found evidence of spatial price cointegration among organic 
markets. Overall, spatial cointegration in organic markets seems weaker than that 
present in conventional markets, suggesting that local market forces may exert a 
stronger effect on the determination of local prices for organic crops than for 
conventional ones. Departures from the long-term relationships across organic markets 
do not seem to increase the probability of price changes; however, whenever price 
changes do occur, they tend to restore such long-term relationships. 
 
The results also suggest that organic prices are as volatile as conventional ones, that the 
premiums paid for organic crops exhibit substantial variability, and that existing futures 
and derivatives markets do not provide effective tools for managing price risks in the 
organic sector. 
 
Organic Yields 
Many studies have compared organic versus conventional production (Badgley et al. 
2007; Delate et al. 2003; Pimentel et al. 2005; Mäder et al. 2002; Delate and 
Cambardella 2004; Porter 2003). Some authors have reported that organic and 
conventional yields are equivalent. Importantly, though, after an extensive literature 
review, we found a noticeable lack of rigorous studies focusing on the difference in 
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production risks of organic versus conventional crops on actual farms. The majority of 
the studies in the literature rely on yields obtained on (smaller) experimental plots where 
weeds can be more easily controlled than is the case for entire farms. This implies that, 
to the best of our knowledge, currently there is no basis for quantitatively determining 
the differential production risk associated with organics and, therefore, whether the 
insurance premiums currently charged to organic producers are actuarially fair. 
 
Using survey farm-level data collected from organic corn and soybean producers in three 
midwestern states (Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin), we found that corn and soybean 
production under organic management attains about 70% of the yield of that of 
conventional crops. Organic oat yields are about the same as conventional ones. The 
finding of a lower yield level for organic corn and soybeans on its own does not allow one 
to infer that organic crops are riskier.  
 
However, the finding has definite implications for organic crop insurance. Under the 
current insurance structure, the base premium rate for crop insurance includes a 
comparison of the producer’s historical average yield (known as the Actual Production 
History [APH] yield) and a reference yield that is determined at the county level. This 
reference yield does not account for organic production practices and is predominantly 
based on conventionally produced crops. Under the formulas used in the premium rate 
calculation, the lower yields from organic production would result in organic producers 
being charged higher premium rates, basically without regard to their idiosyncratic yield 
distributions. Figure 2 displays the different yield distributions for Iowa organic and 
conventional corn and soybean producers. 
 
As many producers utilize revenue insurance, the price examination discussed earlier 
also has implications for crop insurance. As a consequence of organic crops receiving 
higher prices, producers of organic corn and oats obtained 80% higher revenue on 
average per acre than their conventional counterparts, and the organic soybean 
producers obtained about 60% higher revenue. Yet such price and revenue differences 
are not reflected in the crop insurance coverage that organic producers can obtain. 
 
The differences in yield levels and variability between organic and conventional 
producers, along with the substantial price premiums that organic farmers obtain, 
indicate that RMA needs to evaluate the differences between organic and conventional 
production on a nationwide basis and modify the current organic farming insurance 
policy accordingly to provide a more actuarially fair coverage to organic producers.  
 
Organic Revenue Insurance 
RMA has begun to modify organic crop insurance in response to the 2008 farm bill. The 
agency contracted research for the development of a pricing methodology that would 
improve the crop insurance policy for organic crops. A pilot program is in effect for the 
crop year 2011, by which a separate price election is established for a few certified 
organic crops. For 2011, the prices of organic corn and soybeans for insurance purposes 
are the prices of their conventional counterparts multiplied by 1.788 and 1.794, 
respectively. These multipliers are based on the minimum ratios of organic to 
conventional prices observed from January 2007 through September 2009. In this way, 
the pilot program links the price determination of organic crop prices to their 
conventional counterparts by a fixed percentage, which will influence the payouts of both 
yield and revenue protection products for organic crops. But the impact will be greater in 
the latter case. 
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Figure 2. Iowa organic and conventional producers’ four-year Actual 
Production History yield distributions 
 
 
When RMA’s pilot program pegs organic prices to their conventional counterparts and 
uses commodity futures prices to forecast what the organic crop prices will be at harvest 
time, they are assuming that the two markets are not only affected by the same shocks 
but also that they react in a similar fashion. Such linking not only contradicts our earlier 
findings, which suggest that there is no basis for advocating the existence of a long-run 
relationship between organic and conventional prices, but also sharply contrasts with 
observed market dynamics.  
 
Organic crops have historically shown price premiums over their conventional 
counterparts. The average organic premium from October 2004 until July 2009 for corn 
across different U.S. markets was $4.17/bu ($7.41/bu for soybeans). However, organic 
price premiums for corn and soybeans have been shrinking since October 2010. This is 
because of the rise of commodity prices, boosted by increased demand for ethanol and 
simultaneous reductions in forecasted supply, while organic prices have been steady. In 
late February 2011, the time at which crop insurance sets insurable prices, the prices for 
organic corn and soybeans were $8.60/bu and $18.61/bu, respectively, while 
conventional prices were $6.86/bu and $13.38/bu, respectively. Hence, the organic-to-
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conventional price ratios going into the 2011 production year were 1.25 for corn and 1.39 
for soybeans. These are well below RMA’s established prices for both organic crops.  
 
The disparity in the behavior of organic and conventional crop prices implies a changing 
multiplicative relationship between them, making the price ratio larger or smaller 
depending on idiosyncratic shocks, and adding evidence to the idea that the two markets 
are distinct. Thus, the linking of organic to conventional prices for crop insurance 
purposes by a fixed proportion would not only be incorrect but would also make the level 
of participation in crop insurance by organic producers dependant on the relationship 
between the insurance and market prices. This is so because if the price ratio at the time 
of the price discovery (in February) is low and RMA offers to insure the crops at a higher 
level, it creates a clear incentive for organic producers to insure their crops during that 
year under that policy, as the guarantee is being inflated. Conversely, if the price ratio is 
high, and RMA offers insurance at a lower level, the signal for organic producer is not to 
insure because the guarantee is deflated.  
 
Moreover, pegging organic crop prices to conventional ones might also result in 
systematic overpayments or underpayments to producers under the Revenue Protection 
coverage. For example, a decrease in organic prices at harvest time will never be 
compensated for, whereas a decrease in conventional prices will incorrectly be part of an 
organic producer’s indemnities, even if organic prices have risen. Given the evidence of a 
changing multiplicative relationship between organic and conventional crop prices, 
RMA’s pilot program is likely to cause the insurance guarantee for organic crops to be 
either inflated or deflated depending on whether the level of the market price ratio is 
below or above the fixed price factor offered by RMA for insurance purposes. 
 
Upon examination of the relationship between organic and conventional crop prices 
between planting and harvest time, we found that the consequences of the price 
misalignment derived from the pilot program are sizable under revenue insurance 
coverage. Using a stochastic structural model between planting and harvesting applied to 
the U.S. corn market, we found that for the 75% nominal coverage level, when the 
organic-conventional price ratio is low, the mispricing induces an effective coverage of 
106%, and when the price ratio is high, it induces an effective coverage of 45%. This 
implies that RMA’s pilot program is likely to induce adverse selection, because the 
nominal coverage level is likely to substantially understate the effective coverage when 
the ratio of organic to conventional market prices at the time of planting is low and 
overstate the effective coverage when it is high. 
 
Implications 
Even though RMA’s new pilot program represents an improvement over the previous 
organic crop insurance policy by which (in case of a crop failure) organic producers 
obtain an indemnity based on conventional prices, linking organic crops to their 
conventional counterparts creates faulty ratings in their insurance coverage. Yield 
differences have not adequately been taken into account. Price relationships between 
organic and conventional crops are not as consistent as current crop insurance rules 
imply. Organic crop markets have unique characteristics when compared with their 
conventional counterparts. Such idiosyncrasies need to be taken into consideration by 
RMA when setting crop insurance policy for organic farmers.  
 
One recommendation that RMA could utilize quickly to address some of these insurance 
concerns is to use contract prices to set insurance prices for organic production. This is a 
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technique that RMA has used for other specialty crops. Contracting is the major 
marketing mechanism in the organic agricultural sector and contract prices reflect the 
actual market conditions in organic markets. This change would eliminate RMA’s price 
misalignments for organic production.  
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